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Lightness illusions are fundamental to human perception, and yet why we see them is still the focus of much research.
Here we address the question by modelling not human physiology or perception directly as is typically the case but our
natural visual world and the need for robust behaviour. Artificial neural networks were trained to predict the
reflectance of surfaces in a synthetic ecology consisting of 3-D ‘‘dead-leaves’’ scenes under non-uniform illumination.
The networks learned to solve this task accurately and robustly given only ambiguous sense data. In addition—and as
a direct consequence of their experience—the networks also made systematic ‘‘errors’’ in their behaviour
commensurate with human illusions, which includes brightness contrast and assimilation—although assimilation
(specifically White’s illusion) only emerged when the virtual ecology included 3-D, as opposed to 2-D scenes. Subtle
variations in these illusions, also found in human perception, were observed, such as the asymmetry of brightness
contrast. These data suggest that ‘‘illusions’’ arise in humans because (i) natural stimuli are ambiguous, and (ii) this
ambiguity is resolved empirically by encoding the statistical relationship between images and scenes in past visual
experience. Since resolving stimulus ambiguity is a challenge faced by all visual systems, a corollary of these findings is
that human illusions must be experienced by all visual animals regardless of their particular neural machinery. The
data also provide a more formal definition of illusion: the condition in which the true source of a stimulus differs from
what is its most likely (and thus perceived) source. As such, illusions are not fundamentally different from non-illusory
percepts, all being direct manifestations of the statistical relationship between images and scenes.
Citation: Corney D, Lotto RB (2007) What are lightness illusions and why do we see them? PLoS Comput Biol 3(9): e180. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180
Introduction
Understanding how we generate accurate perceptions of
surfaces is often best informed by understanding why we
sometimes do not. Thus, illusions of lightness (and colour) are
essential tools to vision research. In many natural environ-
ments, light levels vary across space and over time. It is
important to be able to perceive surfaces independently of
this varying light intensity (and vice versa) in order to forage
or predate successfully, for example. (By reﬂectance, we mean
the proportion of incident light reﬂected by a surface;
lightness is the perceived reﬂectance of a surface; brightness is
the perceived intensity of light reaching the eye; and luminance
is the actual intensity of the light that reaches the eye with
respect to the sensitivity of the human visual system.)
A number of models of lightness perception have been
proposed, but most of these fail to deal with complex stimuli
or only demonstrate a narrow range of behaviours. For
instance, one well-known heuristic model predicts human
lightness perceptions by ﬁrst subdividing stimuli into multi-
ple ‘‘local frameworks’’ based on, for instance, junction
analysis, and co-planarity as well as other classic gestalt
factors. Then, within each framework, the ratio of a patch’s
intensity and the maximum intensity in that patch’s local
framework is used to predict the reﬂectance, combining a
‘‘bright is white’’ and a ‘‘large is white’’ area rule [1]. These
rules are well-deﬁned and effective for simple stimuli (e.g.,
with two nonzero luminance regions), but the application of
the rule has not been studied for more complex images [1].
Indeed, it is hard to see how such a model could be applied
to even moderately complex stimuli, much less natural
scenes under spatially heterogeneous illumination, without
extremely complex edge-classiﬁcation rules that are as yet
undeﬁned. Furthermore, such human-based heuristics pro-
vide little insight into the physiological and/or computa-
tional principles of vision that are relevant to all visual
animals.
More computational approaches, on the other hand, are
less descriptive, more quantitative, and make fewer assump-
tions. For example, artiﬁcial neural networks (ANNs) have
been trained to extract scene information, such as object
shape and movement, from simple synthetic images [2,3]; and
a statistical approach using Gibbs sampling and Markov
random ﬁelds has been used to separate reﬂectance and
illumination from simple images [4]. Most such models,
however, are unable to explain brightness contrast and
assimilation (e.g., White’s illusion) simultaneously without
recourse to one or more adjustable weighting factors. One
approach that can is the Blakeslee and McCourt ﬁlter model
[5]. By applying a set of ﬁlters (speciﬁcally, a bank of oriented
difference of Gaussians ﬁlters, or ODOG), the model
produces results that correspond closely to psychophysical
results on a wide range of illusory stimuli. The same model,
however, fails to predict the asymmetry of brightness
contrast, where darker surrounds cause larger illusions than
equally lighter surrounds, as we discuss later. ‘‘While these
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presently implemented, permitting different gain parameters
to be applied to the outputs of independent on-channels and
off-channels would constitute a logical ﬁrst step toward
accommodating these differences’’ [6]. It is also important to
stress that the model does not attempt to predict the
reﬂectance of surfaces, only the perceived brightness of a
stimulus, and therefore is unable to explain lightness
constancy in more natural scenes under spatially heteroge-
neous illumination. Related machine vision work includes the
separation of luminance changes into those caused by
shading (including the slant of the surface and direction of
incident light), and those caused by paint on the surface,
using ﬁlters and a mixture of Gaussians [7]; and a localised
‘‘mixture of experts’’ and a set of multiscale ﬁlters has been
used to extract the intrinsic components of an image,
including ‘‘de-noising’’ it [8]. However, these studies do not
attempt to explain the human perception of lightness or
illusions. Thus, explanations as to why and how we see
lightness illusions remain incomplete.
Here we take a different approach to rationalising human
illusions and, by extension, lightness perception generally.
Rather than modelling human perception or known primate
physiology—as is typical of most models—we instead model
the empirical process by which vision resolves the most
fundamental challenge of visual ecology: the inherent
ambiguity of visual stimuli. We make no assumptions about
particular physiology or cognition, but instead model the
process of development/learning from stimuli with feedback
from the environment. This is analogous to the experiential
learning of any animal whose behaviour is guided visually,
and which must learn to resolve perceptual ambiguity in
order to survive.
Results
Fifty ANNs were trained using backpropagation to predict
the reﬂectance of surfaces in synthetic scenes, an example of
which is shown in Figure 1A. Each scene consisted of a 3-D
matrix of 400 matte surfaces (R) under spatially heteroge-
neous patterns of illumination (I). As is the case for the
human visual system, the trained ANNs did not have direct
access to the scenes’ reﬂectance or illumination, but only the
product of the two (R * I ¼ S) at each point in space—thus,
the luminance stimulus (S) in Figure 1D represents the
product of the surface reﬂectance matrix in Figure 1B and
the illumination matrix in Figure 1C. The task was to predict
the source reﬂectance (R) of the stimulus (S) at the centre of
each scene without explicit knowledge of the surface’s
illumination (I).
Surface reﬂectance matrices (Figure 1B) and illumination
matrices (Figure 1C) were created using the ‘‘dead-leaves’’
algorithm, which results in projected images with the same
statistical properties as natural images [9]. In 20% of cases, a
second surface layer with ‘‘gaps’’ in place of surfaces was
placed ‘‘in front’’ of the ﬁrst surface layer, under independent
illumination, equivalent to viewing background objects
beyond independently illuminated foreground objects, such
as looking through the branches of a tree. See Methods for
further details on the ANNs and the ‘‘dead-leaves’’ stimuli.
Note that the ANN training was supervised, meaning that
the true target reﬂectance underlying each stimulus was used
by the backpropagation algorithm to estimate errors during
learning, which provided feedback for the ANNs. While
backpropagation is not physiological in terms of its actual
mechanics, the process of altering the network processing
according the success and/or failure of its output is equivalent
to a visual animal getting feedback from the environment
according to the value of its response. Visual systems have
evolved to aid survival by allowing animals to respond to the
visual environment successfully. This does not necessarily
require veridical percepts of the world, but we assume here
that generating behaviours that are consistent with surface
reﬂectance, along with other characteristics, will be useful to
a visual animal. Animals that generate behaviours that
preserve the similarities and differences between surfaces
will typically receive some form of feedback from their
environment, such as the reward of eating nutritious food or
the penalty of eating noxious food. In the same way, ‘‘virtual
robots’’ have been shown to develop a form of colour
constancy without supervised learning in a visually ambig-
uous ecology [10]. This feedback can be modelled explicitly
using artiﬁcial life [10] or reinforcement learning [11], but in
this work our focus is not on learning algorithms themselves,
but rather on what is encoded. We therefore ignore the
temporal credit assignment problem, i.e., the problem of how
an animal decides which of its past actions led to a particular
reward or penalty. Instead, we consider other sources of
uncertainty such as the ambiguity caused by heterogeneous
light falling on varied surfaces.
Our emphasis on learning contrasts with ‘‘mechanistic’’
modelling approaches (in the sense deﬁned in [12]), such as
the ‘‘Anchored Filling-in Lightness Model’’ [13]. That model
describes many of the visual effects discussed here, and more
besides, based on neural and anatomical experimental data. It
is not derived directly from ecological data in the way that
ANNs’ behaviour here is, and so cannot give a distal
explanation as to why such visual behaviours are found.
Similarly, the computational Bayesian approach in [12] uses a
parametric model, whose form has been chosen manually,
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Author Summary
Sometimes the best way to understand how the visual brain works is
to understand why it sometimes does not. Thus, visual illusions have
been central to the science and philosophy of human consciousness
for decades. Here we explain the root cause of brightness illusions,
not by modelling human perception or its assumed physiological
substrate (as is more typically done), but by modelling the basic
challenge that all visual animals must resolve if they are to survive:
the inherent ambiguity of sensory data. We do this by training
synthetic neural networks to recognise surfaces under different
lights in scenes with naturalistic structure. The result is that the
networks not only solve this task robustly (i.e., they exhibit
‘‘lightness constancy’’), they also—as a consequence—exhibit the
same illusions of lightness that humans also see. In short, these
synthetic systems not only get it right like we do, but also get it
wrong like we do, too. This emergent coincidence strongly provides
causal evidence that illusions (and by extension all percepts)
represent the probable source of images in past visual experience,
which has fundamental consequences for explaining how and why
we see what we do. The study also suggests the first formal
definition of what an illusion is: The condition in which the actual
source of a stimulus differs from its most likely source.
Why We See Illusionswhereas the ANNs used here are a nonparametric model,
derived entirely from the data.
Lightness Constancy
After training, each ANN was tested with 10,000 novel
images created in the same way as the images in the training
set, and the ANN’s prediction of the reﬂectance of each target
patch was recorded. The average root-mean-squared (RMS)
error for predicted reﬂectance to the novel test set was 0.171
(with a standard deviation of 0.0016) and the errors
approximated a Gaussian distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
normality test; p ’ 0). Thus, trained ANNs—like humans—
were able to accurately and robustly predict the reﬂectance of
the central surface from uncertain sensory data; i.e., the
ANNs exhibited ‘‘lightness constancy’’ (see related work on
depth processing [14], the evolution of visually guided
behaviour in virtual robots [15], and distance perception
[16]; and on perceiving colour constancy by estimating the
illumination of a scene using higher-order statistics [17]).
Robust response accuracy, however, varied according to the
nature of the stimulus. When, for instance, the central target
was viewed against a uniform background with uniform
illumination (rather than against a fully articulated sur-
round), the RMS error increased signiﬁcantly to 0.20 (s.d.
0.015; t-test: p ’ 0, n¼50). An equivalent decrease in lightness
(and colour) constancy in low variance scenes is also evident
in human perception [18–21]. The study here suggests that
this is because increasing the number of surfaces in a scene
(i.e., ‘‘articulation,’’ which is a subset of the more general
phenomenon of ‘‘cue-combination’’) narrows the distribution
of possible sources of a stimulus, which has been suggested
previously in human studies but never tested directly [20,21].
Brightness Contrast
A basic aspect of human lightness and brightness is that
these phenomena do not always accord with stimulus
intensity, which is to say we see illusions. The most basic,
well-known, and most thoroughly studied illusion is ‘‘bright-
ness contrast,’’ where a central target against a lighter
background appears darker than the same target viewed
against a darker background (as will be evident to the reader
when viewing the two small patches at the middle of the light
and dark surrounds in Figure 2A). To test whether trained
ANNs also behave in accordance with this illusion, ANNs
were presented with ‘‘hand-made’’ stimuli, in which a target
stimulus of 0.5 was embedded on uniform surrounds that
varied from 0 to 1. The darkest surrounds lead to an average
overestimation error of 0.36, whereas the lightest surrounds
lead to an average underestimation error of 0.17. Thus, trained
ANNs did indeed exhibit brightness contrast. What is more,
the data show that they also exhibited an asymmetry in the
relative effects of the darker versus lighter surrounds, with
the darker surround ‘‘carrying’’ most of the illusion.
Remarkably, this latter asymmetry is also evident in human
perception [1,6,22]. The anchoring model [1] explains this in
terms of a weighted sum of global and local anchoring and
‘‘scale normalisation’’ effects; however, while that model ﬁts
the psychophysical data, it is not predictive as to the strength
Figure 1. Synthetic ‘‘Dead-Leaves’’ Stimuli
(A) ‘‘Dead-leaves’’ example, composed of occluding circular disks with
radius r and distribution 1/r
3. The intensity of each ‘‘leaf’’ is
independently drawn from a uniform distribution.
(B) Reflectance matrix (R), which represents a 20 3 20 subsection
randomly chosen from the larger ‘‘dead-leaves’’ stimulus. Typically,
between 40 and 60 ‘‘leaves’’ were at least partially visible in each
reflectance map.
(C) The light falling on a typical surface will come from many sources, so
we model illumination with a more gradual change across space than for
reflection (see Methods for details). The example illumination matrix (I)
shown here is a 20320 section chosen from a similar map as R but with
larger disks than with reflection maps, typically containing 10–15 leaves.
These were then heavily blurred producing maps of typically 200–400
distinct levels of intensity, but with a high level of spatial correlation.
(D) Stimulus intensity matrix (S), which is the pixel-wise product of B and
C: S ¼ I 3 R. All the values are in the range 0...1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180.g001
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Why We See Illusionsof the effect, because the weight is never explicitly deﬁned. A
probabilistic model more similar to the one here also
explains the nonlinear relationship between lightness and
intensity in terms of possible real-world sources of an
ambiguous stimulus [22], if the relative contributions of
reﬂectance and illumination can be estimated. However, the
nonlinearity in brightness contrast, which can be inferred
from this model, is symmetrical, not asymmetrical as it is
here—and in human perception.
Our model suggests a more explicitly data-driven explan-
ation. We express the reﬂectance R and illumination I as
fractions of their potential maximum values, so in all cases 0
, I , 1 and 0 , R , 1. Because the stimulus intensity S¼I *
R, it is similarly bounded between zero and one. Therefore,
the value of S deﬁnes the minimum possible illumination and
reﬂectance of a target. As an example of this, suppose that S¼
0.7 in some particular stimulus; the darkest possible value of
R corresponds to the maximum illumination I¼1, giving R¼
0.7 as the minimum lightness possible. If the exact illumina-
tion is unknown, then the bounds are 0.7   R   1 in this case,
and conversely, 0.7   I   1. In the extreme, if S¼1, then R¼1
and I ¼ 1 are the only possible sources and the stimulus is
totally unambiguous. Conversely, images (or parts of images)
with low luminance intensity are more ambiguous—i.e., have
a wider range of possible scores for I and R—than high-
intensity images. This increased range of possible sources of
darker images leads to a greater magnitude of perceptual
errors on average, which translates into a larger over-
Figure 2. Brightness Contrast Stimuli
(A) Simultaneous brightness contrast illusion. See text for explanation.
(B) Articulated surrounds with mean S ¼ 0.25 and S ¼ 0.75 with same target intensity S ¼ 0.4. See text for explanation.
(C) Concentric rings, both with an average intensity of S ¼ 0.5 and a target intensity of S ¼ 0.5.
In (A–C), ANNs predict a higher reflectance for the stimulus on the left compared to the stimulus on the right.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180.g002
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Why We See Illusionsestimation of reﬂectance compared to lighter surrounds on
average, assuming that negative values are never predicted.
We are not claiming that visual systems must explicitly
contain such a model of physics, or that the exact values must
be known, but only that past experiences of the consequences
of the physics of the environment are encoded in the system,
and so behaviour guided by such experiences will lead to the
observed patterns of errors.
Other Lightness Illusions
An important aspect of brightness contrast in humans is
that the strength of the illusion is as much a function of
stimulus structure as it is of stimulus intensity. For instance,
increasing a scene’s articulation (as in Figure 2B) increases
human perception of brightness contrast considerably
[23,24]. Similarly, when presented with targets on two fully
articulated surrounds (one light, one dark), the difference in
the predicted reﬂectance of the identical targets was
increased (Figure 2B). Also, altering the spatial conﬁguration
of a target’s surround, without altering the average lumi-
nance, can create the illusion of brightness contrast. When
the nets were presented with targets on surrounds of
identical average intensity, but of differing spatial structure
(Figure 2C), they continued to underestimate the target on a
local light surround, and overestimate the target in a local dark
surround much like humans, speciﬁcally outputting R ¼ 0.32
(0.025) and R ¼ 0.74 (0.011), respectively, for the images
shown in Figure 2C. The papers summarised in [23] discuss
various aspects of articulation in detail, including the effect
of both the number of surfaces in a scene and their structural
organisation. Similarly here, it is not simply increasing the
number of surfaces that leads to better constancy (and so to
smaller errors), but the structure of the articulation. More
speciﬁcally, what matters is past experience regarding the
probable source of that articulated information, as has been
suggested previously [23].
The ANNs were next tested on other, more complex but
well-known brightness contrast–like phenomena, speciﬁcally
the Vasarely illusion, Mach bands, Chevreul patterns, and the
Hermann grid. In the Vasarely illusion (Figure 3A), the
corners of each repeated square appear brighter than their
immediate surround (which results in what looks like a four-
edged star), even though the stimulus is uniform at these
junctions. In Mach bands (Figure 3B), a linear gradient
appears to be ﬂanked by a highlight at the lightest end of the
gradient and a ‘‘lowlight’’ at the gradient’s minimum. Neither
of these features actually exists in the intensity proﬁle of the
stimulus. In Chevreul patterns (Figure 3C), uniform bars
appear graded in lightness. And in the Hermann grid (Figure
3D), light spots appear at the central junction of the dark
lines where no light dot actually exists. The 50 trained ANNs
were presented with each of these stimuli in turn, none of
which were presented during training. Their average re-
sponse is shown in the corresponding row of the right column
in Figure 3A–3D. By comparing the stimulus’ intensity proﬁle
(red line) with the nets’ response proﬁle (blue line) at each
corresponding point, it is clear that, as before, the networks
exhibit responses that are qualitatively similar to human
perception in each instance. (Whether they are quantitatively
similar to human perception is not relevant, given the
inevitable differences in complexity between natural ecology
and the ‘‘dead-leaves’’ ecology.)
White’s Illusion
The results thus far are consistent with the hypothesis that
human illusions of lightness are caused by nothing more (or
less) than image ambiguity and its empirical—and thus
statistical—resolution. The above contrast illusions, however,
are also consonant with many other models predicted on, for
instance, the statistics of natural images or assumption about
low-level and mid-level processing [1,5,24–25]. Indeed, any
model that incorporates lateral inhibitory connections, such
as centre/surround receptive ﬁelds, will predict most of the
above phenomena (e.g., [5,25]), which is the typical explan-
ation in most neuroscience textbooks. Few explanations,
however, can simultaneously predict both brightness contrast
(including its asymmetry) and brightness assimilation—e.g.,
White’s illusion—without recourse to one or more adjustable
free parameters [25]. (Important exceptions include the ﬁlter
model discussed previously [5] and a statistical approach
which uses a database of natural scenes to estimate
probability distributions over structures in lightness stimuli,
including White’s stimulus [26].) What makes these two
illusions difﬁcult to reconcile simultaneously is that they
are diametrically opposed to one another. In brightness
contrast, the target on a dark surround appears lighter than
the same target on a light surround (Figure 2A), whereas the
opposite is true for assimilation in general and White’s
illusion in particular: the target on the overall darker local
surround appears darker (not lighter) than the same target on
the overall lighter local surround (Figure 3E; see [1] for an
elegant description of these phenomena and their current
explanations). White’s stimulus can be interpreted as a series
of vertical dark and light bars partially obscuring a pair of
mid-grey bars on a monochrome background.
Here, the trained ANNs exhibited both brightness contrast
and White’s illusion (see right column of Figure 3E). As always,
the emergent behaviour of the ANNs can be explained in
terms of the statistics of their visual experience. Of particular
relevance is their experience with the 3-D layering of the
surfaces in space. A separate group of ANNs was trained
using scenes composed of surfaces in only one depth plane,
consisting of the same ‘‘dead-leaves’’ images described in the
Methods section, but without the separate mask layer on any
of the stimuli. Compared to the main group of ANNs, these
lost the ‘‘ability’’ to see White’s illusion, but maintained the
ability to see lightness constancy, brightness contrast, and
related phenomena (unpublished data). Thus, when pre-
sented with surfaces at different depth planes under
independent illumination, the ANNs learned to ignore
information arising from surfaces that were not co-planar
with the target; since illumination of each depth-plane is
independent, only co-planar information provides statistical
information about the probable source of the target. Thus,
changing the ecology (by introducing layers using masks)
leads directly to a change in behaviour (the ANNs’ response
to White’s stimulus) showing a causal link between the two.
It is important to emphasise, however, that while White’s
illusion only arises when the networks had experience of 3-D
scenes, this is not equivalent to saying that the networks
‘‘represented’’ depth in their post-receptor processing. In-
deed, it is highly unlikely that the networks encode depth
information explicitly, or indeed contour junction cues, as
has been posited for human visual processing, since varying
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Why We See Illusionsthe spatial frequency of the stimulus or the height of the
individual test patch varies the strength of the illusory
response (see Figure 4A and 4B, respectively) without altering
the stimulus’ junctions. More speciﬁcally, decreasing the
spatial frequency of the stimulus and/or target height
decreases the ANNs’ perception of White’s illusion without
altering the stimulus’ junctions. Remarkably, these latter two
observations have also been made of human perception of
White’s stimulus [5].
Seeing without Context
Not all human lightness illusions are a consequence of
spatial context, and in these cases we found further
similarities between the ANN’s behaviour and human visual
perception. For instance, when viewed in a ‘‘void’’ (i.e., on a
black surround), the relationship between a surface’s stimulus
and its (human-) perceived lightness is not linear, but follows
the power law w(S)¼kS
a, where w(S) is the perceived lightness,
S is the physical intensity of the stimulus, k is a scaling
constant, and a is the exponent that describes the shape of
the relationship to perceived lightness. For humans, the value
of the exponent a typically varies between 0.33 to 0.5 in
different studies [27]. When the ANNs are presented with
uniform images of increasing intensity, the relationship
between target intensity and predicted reﬂectance also
follows a power law with an exponent (a)t h a te q u a l s
0.334—broadly similar to humans.
Figure 4. White’s Stimuli and ANN Responses
(A) Three White’s stimuli of varying spatial frequency and (B) three White’s stimuli with different target patch heights. In all cases, the left-hand target
patch has the same intensity as the right-hand patch, but generally appears darker to humans. The stimuli seen by the ANNs are 20 3 20 pixels.
(C) Mean ANN responses to White’s stimuli of varying frequencies with varying test patch heights. Each value is the difference in predicted reflectance
for the two test patches. A positive difference means that the test patch on the light bar appears darker than the test patch on the dark bar; a negative
difference means the test patch on the light bar appears lighter than the patch on the dark bar. The former is consistent with White’s illusion, the latter
with brightness contrast. The results show i) that decreasing the frequency of the background stripes (i.e., making them wider) also decreases the
strength of White’s illusion; and also ii) that increasing the height of the test patch decreases the strength of White’s illusion. Both results correspond to
human psychophysical responses [5].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180.g004
Figure 3. Artificial Neural Network Responses to Optical Illusions
(A) Vasarely illusion stimulus on left. Note the illusory regions of lightness along the diagonals formed by the corners of the concentric squares. Blue line
on right indicates the intensity profile at the corresponding points of the blue line on the left. Red line shows the relative reflectance predicted by the
networks. Units are arbitrary and so are not plotted throughout this figure.
(B) Mach band stimulus consisting of a dark bar (left) and a light bar (right) with a linear gradient between. Blue line on right indicates the intensity
profile at the corresponding points of the blue line on the left. Red line shows the relative reflectance predicted by the networks.
(C) Chevreul illusion stimulus, with five bars of uniform reflectance. Blue line on right indicates the intensity profile at the corresponding points of the
blue line on the left. Red line shows the relative reflectance predicted by the networks.
(D) Hermann grid illusion stimulus. Blue line on right indicates the intensity profile at the corresponding points of the blue line on the left. Red line
shows the relative reflectance predicted by the networks.
(E) White’s illusion on left. The grey areas indicated have the same physical reflectance, although the left-hand one appears darker than the other. The
ANN response on the right corresponds to this human experience, with the first perceived reflectance (1) being darker than the second (2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180.g003
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Why We See IllusionsDiscussion
The ANNs used here are structurally unlike the human
visual system: they are smaller and less complex; they lack
recurrent connections, spiking, adaptation (after learning is
complete), and so on; they are nonhierarchical, and so cannot
generate behaviours according to so-called ‘‘top-down,’’
‘‘mid-level,’’ or ‘‘cognitive’’ inﬂuences on ‘‘bottom-up’’
processing. Indeed, these ANNs lack all the proximal
mechanisms that are usually thought to be the immediate
cause of human visual illusions. Instead, the output of each
ANN is driven solely by the statistics of its training history
instantiated in the functional architecture of its network.
Though sometimes seen as a drawback, this simplicity is taken
advantage of to rationalise human illusions, not by modelling
what is currently known of human perception and/or primate
neurophysiology, but by modelling the inherent ambiguity of
human and nonhuman visual ecology that all natural systems
must solve to survive, and its empirical resolution. This
extends several recent studies that have found relationships
between the statistics of images of natural scenes and human
perception (e.g., [25–26,28–30]). We can begin to move from
correlative to causative explanations.
Perception can be deﬁned as the process of acquiring and
organising information from sensors. The input nodes of the
ANNs are presented with images in terms of the luminance
intensity across space, from which the ANNs must extract
scene information, speciﬁcally the reﬂectance of a target
patch. This is equivalent to one of the many tasks that the
human visual system performs. The Oxford English Dictionary
deﬁnes an illusion as ‘‘something that deceives or deludes by
producing a false impression.’’ Every instrument has meas-
urement errors and the human visual system is no exception.
So every percept will have an error associated with it, be it
large or small. Errors in visual perception are deﬁned as the
difference between what is seen and what the actual physical
quality of the retinal stimulus with which the percept is
associated is [1], irrespective of whether the physical source is
ever known. Given this deﬁnition, a so-called ‘‘illusory
image,’’ such as the stimuli in Figure 3, is one that induces
perceptions that deviate from the underlying reality of the
image, a view consistent with recent Bayesian frameworks of
constancy (e.g., [12]). There is, however, no absolute threshold
on these errors that deﬁnes a percept as illusory or non-
illusory. We must therefore consider the magnitude of
perceptual errors and relate these to the past experiences
of the observer.
Returning to the ANNs used earlier, recall that when shown
novel ‘‘dead-leaves’’ images, the RMS error was 0.171.
Furthermore, approximately 79% of the predictions were
within 60.2 of the target, and just 1% of the errors were
greater than 60.5; i.e., most images were interpreted
approximately correctly, but none perfectly. The equivalent
error for simultaneous brightness contrast (Figure 2A), with a
mid-grey patch on a black background, was 0.36 (s.d. 0.032),
an unusually large error. As a speciﬁc example, Figure 5
shows the range of all possible reﬂectances of a single target
patch (x-axis) and their relative probabilities (y-axis), for a
single ‘‘dead-leaves’’ stimulus. The probabilities are derived
from the past experiences of a single ANN, and the peak on
the curve corresponds to a reﬂectance (R) of 0.93. This is by
deﬁnition the ‘‘most likely source’’ of this particular stimulus
in the ANN’s past visual experience. If the actual reﬂectance
of the stimulus under consideration is close to the most likely
source of the stimulus (i.e., a surface with a reﬂectance close
to 0.93), then the prediction/percept is ‘‘correct’’ and we
would say that lightness constancy holds. One would also say
that the percept is not an illusion. If, on the other hand, the
actual reﬂectance happened not to be near the most likely
source of the stimulus (i.e., more than or less than 0.93), then
while the predicted reﬂectance would have been ‘‘correct’’
most of the time, it would be ‘‘wrong’’ in this particular instance,
lightness constancy would have failed, and the percept would
be called an illusion. What is more, the further into the tail of
‘‘unlikeliness’’ the source of the stimulus is, the more
‘‘illusory’’ the percept becomes, suggesting that illusions of
lightness and lightness constancy exist on a continuum, as
opposed to being fundamentally different kinds of phenom-
ena.
It is therefore misleading to describe any stimulus as being
an illusion in isolation. Instead, one can describe the true
source of a stimulus as being unlikely given the past
experiences of a particular observer, and therefore likely to
induce an erroneous percept in that observer. Given the
similarity of the shared experiences of humans, and our
shared genes, it should not be surprising that the patterns of
errors that we make are also shared. The exact distribution of
errors for human or animal perception is hard to quantify,
and the factors leading to more or less lightness constancy are
largely unknown [23]. However, it seems clear that most
responses are approximately correct, at least where it is
possible to measure the true source, although constancy does
fail signiﬁcantly in some cases. The nearest human psycho-
physical study that we are aware of measures colour
constancy for coloured papers under varying illumination
[31]. They deﬁne a constancy index that ranges from 0 for no
constancy to 1 for perfect constancy, the latter meaning that
a surface colour is perceived according to the surface spectral
Figure 5. Conditional Probability Distribution of Reflectance Given Past
Experience and a Particular Stimulus as Context
A maximum-likelihood estimation allows the observer to predict the
target reflectance and will be correct (approximately) most of the time. If
the true reflectance actually lies in a low-likelihood tail of the
distribution, then the resulting percept is an illusion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180.g005
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measure a colour constancy index of around 0.8, although in
many experiments the index was much lower. Constancy can
be seen as the inverse of illusions, if we assume that the
constant response has a small error under a range of
illuminations, and illusions generate large errors. The errors
of the ANNs suggest a similar magnitude of constancy,
although direct comparison between such different measures
is never ideal. We know of no such score for lightness
constancy under typical, natural conditions, but it is
reasonable to suppose a broadly similar continuous distribu-
tion exists for humans, too.
In conclusion, the emergent similarity between human
perception and the ANNs’ output provides direct support for
the view that illusions are caused by (as opposed to merely
correlated with) the statistics of past visual experience
towards surfaces in space under spatially heterogeneous
illumination given ambiguous image data. Because stimulus
ambiguity is an inherent challenge of natural visual ecology,
illusions must also be inevitable in nature, suggesting that
human illusions are common to all visual animals despite vast
differences in their underlying neural machinery, which has
important consequences for thinking about the biological
and computational principles of vision. Evolving or training
synthetic systems in ecologically relevant environments
provides an important new strategy for uncovering what
these principles are that usefully map images to scenes
according to the statistics of experience. Finally, the study
provides a clear description of what an illusion is, and why we
see them: an illusion describes the condition in which the
actual source of a stimulus differs from the stimulus’ most
likely source given the observer’s past experience.
Methods
Artiﬁcial neural networks. The ANNs used here were standard
multilayer perceptrons trained via backpropagation. We use multi-
layer perceptrons because they are known to be universal approx-
imators, capable of learning arbitrary mappings from a ﬁnite set of
examples. In preliminary experiments, we achieved similar results
using support vector regression methods (unpublished data), and
believe that any suitable powerful nonlinear multivariate regression
tool would work as well. The behaviour we describe is ultimately due
to the data, not the learning algorithm.
Each ANN had 400 inputs nodes, one for each pixel of the stimuli;
four hidden nodes in one layer; and one output node. The training
was supervised, so the target reﬂectance in the training images was
used to estimate errors during the training. The output was therefore
the ANN’s prediction of the reﬂectance of the central target patch of
the stimulus presented to it. The inputs consisted solely of the
stimulus intensity, and not reﬂection or illumination explicitly. All
nodes were fully connected to nodes of their adjacent layers; there
were no connections between nodes of the same layer; and
connection weights could be positive or negative. Each ANN was
initialised with random weights, then trained for 150 iterations with
20,000 training images. These parameters were chosen based on
preliminary experiments, and are not critical. Many factors are
known to affect the performance of ANNs, such as the number of
hidden nodes, the learning rate, the number of training iterations
(see Figures S1 and S2), the number of training examples, and so on.
Furthermore, these factors tend to interact, making any exhaustive
analysis effectively impossible, and making it difﬁcult to guarantee
that any particular ANN is ‘‘optimal.’’ However, our aim here is not
optimality, but is rather to show that the results described in the
paper are robust, and, to demonstrate this, we now brieﬂy analyse
some of these parameter settings.
All nonparametric learning systems, including ANNs trained by
backpropagation, are prone to ‘‘overﬁtting,’’ when they accurately
model the data that they are trained with, but fail to generalise well to
novel data. One conventional solution is to stop training after a ﬁxed
number of iterations, before this problem arises, which is why we
limit the training algorithm to 150 iterations (see Figure S1).
To see the effect of varying the number of hidden nodes, we
trained a series of ANNs, each containing between one and 50 nodes
in a single hidden layer. The minimum error corresponds to ANNs
with four nodes in their hidden layer (see Table S1). However, a series
of t-tests indicate that the other ANNs achieved performances that
were not signiﬁcantly different (p . 0.05 in all cases). Thus, the choice
for the number of nodes is somewhat arbitrary, reinforcing the
notion that it is the statistics of the training set that are critical,
rather than the ﬁne details of the learning algorithm.
Next we considered the number of training records used by the
backpropagation algorithm. Again, we trained a series of ANNs with
sets of novel ‘‘dead-leaves’’ stimuli. Each ANN had four hidden nodes,
but the number of training records varied from 333 to 20,000. As
expected, being given more training examples allowed the ANNs to
achieve a lower test error, because each independent training
example provides extra information about the underlying function
(see Table S2). Given the trend of decreasing returns, increasing the
number of records above 20,000 would make only a marginal
difference, with the cost of longer training times.
Each node of an ANN contains an activation (or ‘‘transfer’’)
function, which takes the sum of the inputs and transforms it,
typically rescaling the value to a ﬁxed range. A typical activation
function, which we use in the ANNs described in the main paper, is
the log sigmoid function, which produces values in the range [0, 1].
The tan sigmoid function, which produces values in the range [ 1,þ1]
and the linear transfer function, which produced unbounded values,
were also used in new ANNs for comparison. As the errors in Table S3
show, there is no signiﬁcant difference between log sigmoid and tan
sigmoid functions, as expected. The pure linear activation function,
which gives no bounds on the outputs, leads to signiﬁcantly worse
performance. Thus the choice of a particular activation function is
not critical, although in the extreme case of a linear function,
learning is considerably degraded.
We also tested some of these alternative ANNs with the various
‘‘illusion’’ stimuli used elsewhere in the paper. As a simpliﬁed
measure of different ANNs responses to the test ‘‘illusory’’ stimuli, we
measured each ANN’s predicted reﬂectance for the test patches in
the brightness contrast, Hermann grid, and White’s stimuli (see
Figures 2A, 3D, and 3E, respectively). For each stimulus, we selected
two pixels that had identical reﬂectance values but generate illusory
responses in humans. For each pair, we calculated the difference in
the ANN’s response, such that a score of zero means that they do
NOT perceive any illusion, and a positive score corresponds to
human perceptions. (This is the same differential measure used in
Figure 4C.) The larger the positive score, the stronger the illusion is
perceived. Negative scores indicate the ‘‘opposite’’ of human
perception. While there is no direct relationship between the
magnitudes and human perception, they do provide an indication
of the strengths of the illusions for the ANNs. The overall effect is
that as training proceeds, the error drops and the strength of the
illusions increases (Figure S2). This again shows that the appearance
of illusions is causally related to solving the lightness constancy
problem.
All experiments were carried out on a standard desktop PC using
Matlab 6.5 (Mathworks) and the Matlab Neural Networks toolbox
version 4.
‘‘Dead-leaves’’ images. A number of 200 3 200 pixel ‘‘dead-leaves’’
images were created following the algorithm presented by Lee et al.
[9], which produces images with similar statistics as those that have
been found in a wide range of natural scenes. The implementation we
used was based on Matlab code provided in the Toolbox Signal (2006)
by Gabriel Peyre ´. Each image was composed of a large number of
partially occluding achromatic disks, which can be thought of as a
series of ‘‘dead leaves’’ falling on top of each other. The leaf radius is
distributed as 1/r
3, so these images tend to have a few large ‘‘leaves’’
and many smaller ones, much as with natural scenes. For presenta-
tions to the ANNs, random 20320 pixel samples were selected from
these large images. The minimum-sized disk was ﬁxed at 0.002 for the
reﬂection maps and 0.01 for the illumination maps. The latter were
blurred by ﬁltering with a Gaussian ﬁlter of size 838 with a width of
15. The stimulus matrix presented to the ANNs is deﬁned as S¼I * R.
Both I and R (and therefore S) are scaled in the range 0...1. Where a
second layer was used to create 3-D stimuli (in one-ﬁfth of the
training set), the same procedure was used to create the surfaces and
the illumination. The layer was then reduced to a series of random
horizontal and vertical strips covering an average of 10% of the
image opaquely. The remaining 90% was unchanged. The target
could be in either layer. We have not carried out any human
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however, the algorithm is designed to generate images that are
statistically similar to natural scenes, so we assume that human
responses would be quite consistent with responses to natural scenes.
Preliminary work showed that if the distribution of the reﬂectance
and illumination maps were very similar, then the ability to resolve
lightness constancy in the ANNs was reduced, though not abolished
(unpublished data). Presumably, this is because every stimulus was so
ambiguous that resolution was increasingly difﬁcult. Given that
humans and other animals can solve lightness constancy at least most
of the time, the real visual ecology must provide enough information
to allow the disambiguation to take place. In our simpliﬁed model,
this is achieved by ensuring that the distributions of R and I are
sufﬁciently different.
These ‘‘dead-leave’’ images, with heterogeneous light and partial
masking, represent a simple model ecology. The size of the distinct
surfaces within each scene follows the same distribution as found in
natural scenes. The illumination is assumed to come from multiple
sources, consistent with some light being reﬂected from nearby
surfaces. The reﬂectance map is therefore approximately piecewise
constant, while the illumination map only changes smoothly, as in [4]
and elsewhere. The addition of a second ‘‘masking’’ layer aims to
simulate effects such as the viewer looking through the branches of a
tree or through a windowframe. Such a simple model could be
extended in many ways to make it more natural and realistic, such as
added colour, transmittance effects, depth, objects of varied shape
with or without attached shadows, sharp shadow edges, and so on.
Several of these are the subject of ongoing work, which will allow a
wider range of visual behaviours to be studied, such as testing the
models’ response to colour illusion stimuli. Similarly, we have chosen
not to model the eye explicitly, such as deﬁning cone response
functions or light adaptation, instead concentrating on the more
generic aspects of learning to respond to a visual ecology.
Supporting Information
Figure S1. Overﬁtting Caused by Training the ANN for Too Many
Epochs
The error on the training set continues to drop as the back-
propagation algorithm continues, but the test error on novel ‘‘dead-
leaves’’ images starts to rise after around 150–200 epochs. This
overﬁtting is a problem with any nonparametric learning algorithm,
such as ANNs, and a typical solution that we adopt is to stop training
after a ﬁxed number of iterations (150).
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180.sg001 (36 KB DOC).
Figure S2. ANNs’ Response to Various Stimuli during Training
For each test stimulus, we selected two pixels that had identical
reﬂectance values but generate illusory responses in humans. For the
brightness contrast and White’s stimuli, we used the pair of test mid-
grey patches, and for the Hermann Grid we used an ‘‘intersection’’
pixel and an ‘‘edge’’ pixel halfway between two intersections. The
RMS error is the usual test against a novel set of ‘‘dead-leaves’’
images. As training continues, the test error drops (left axis) and the
strength of the illusory percepts tends to increase (right axis).
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180.sg002 (383 KB DOC).
Table S1. The Effect of the Number of Hidden Nodes
None of the test errors is signiﬁcantly worse than the optimum,
corresponding to four hidden nodes (two-tailed t-test; p . 0.05 in all
cases). In each case, the number of training epochs was adjusted to
minimise the test error.
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180.st001 (31 KB DOC).
Table S2. The Effect of the Number of Training Records on ANNs
with Four Hidden Nodes
Providing more training examples leads to lower test errors, at a
decreasing rate.
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180.st002 (29 KB DOC).
Table S3. Various ANN Activation Functions
Two-tailed t-tests show that: log sigmoid is not signiﬁcantly different
to tan sigmoid (p ¼ 0.067); log sigmoid is signiﬁcantly better than
pure linear (p ’ 0); tan sigmoid is signiﬁcantly better than pure linear
(p ’ 0).
Found at doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030180.st003 (26 KB DOC).
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